Premiers' Terms Too Short to Matter

　　　　　2001/4/6 Daily Yomiuri Politics Inside掲載記事

Japanese prime ministers in recent years have seemed to rise and fall as often as the tides, and like the tides they leave behind a lot of debris without changing the basic shape of the shore.

This country has witnessed the launch of seven administrations over the past 10 years. Frequent shifts in power have been taking place at least since 1993, when the Liberal Democratic Party--a key contributor to the nation's economic growth and stability in the days following the end of World War II--was voted out of office. This dealt a fatal blow to the LDP's predominance on the Japanese political scene. The nation has since replaced one prime minister after another--as if to reiterate its determination to tackle the host of challenges it faces, including efforts to write prescriptions for its economic woes and promote structural reforms.

During the last 10 years, however, no prime minister has been given enough time to ensure that his own initiative in this regard will produce workable solutions or gratifying results. The reform plan put together by each prime minister has seen its initiator step down as the nation's political leader shortly thereafter. The proposal is then reduced to a tool in a power struggle. As a result, none of the reform plans designed by successive prime ministers over the past 10 years have served their purpose.

The 1990s are often termed the "lost decade" in that the country has become mired in economic gridlock arising from the collapse of the bubble economy and its failure to promote structural reforms. The lost decade also signifies an era of short-lived political leadership.

Why have Japanese administrations been unable to persevere during the last decade?

There is reason to presume that the frequent transfers of power are a result of factors inherent in the fabric of this country's contemporary politics, although an exception must be made for the Cabinet of former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, which did not last long because of his fatal illness.

First and foremost, the 1990s were a time of great tribulation for all prime ministers. During this period, the nation was confronted with many difficult structural reform tasks, including deregulation and administrative and fiscal reforms. This reform effort represented an attempt to drastically change various systems and practices established since the end of the war. All this was exacerbated by the worst recession of the postwar period.

Despite the hardships confronted by the government, the public became exceedingly frustrated with the successive prime ministers. The frustration felt by members of the public reflected their concerns about such economic woes as a rise in the jobless rate due to the prolonged recession and cuts in the corporate workforce. Voters became impatient and demanded that the government find quick solutions to these problems.

In addition, the impatient sentiment entertained by voters may have arisen, in part, from a perception gap between ordinary members of the public and political leaders in terms of how fast the reforms should be carried out. The public expects swift reforms to take place in the age of globalization. However, politicians do not seem to share the same sentiment.

Many urban dwellers have been quick to recognize the force of globalization when they find themselves doing work that relates to the world economy in one way or another. This is in stark contrast to politicians who devote a good portion of their time to dealing with matters of domestic interest in a conventional manner.

The frustrated public has to wonder why Japan was left behind as a partner to the United States in pursuing economic growth at a time when that country's economy was enjoying an unprecedented boom. This honest frustration causes the public to expect that circumstances will take a favorable turn if their prime minister is replaced by a new leader. It is tempting for political leaders to react to this by writing superficial prescriptions for reforms.

The kind of action taken by politicians is a far cry from the drastic solutions called for by the problems facing their nation. This can be best symbolized by the series of myopic pump-priming measures taken by the government in recent years, using massive amounts of taxpayers' money. Instead of implementing measures to aid a new generation of globally conscious innovators and electronic commerce entrepreneurs, for example, the government has spent massive funds on conventional public works projects, although such projects are not effective in producing economically multiplying effects.

All this means that the nation's conventional systems and practices have been kept intact, slowing down the struggle for structural reforms. In other words, the government has not been able to break the futile cycle of a continued recession combined with a decline in the approval ratings of the various administrations. ===

Vested interests a hurdle to reforms

The second reason for Japan's revolving-door political leadership may be efforts by the power elite in various sectors to protect their vested interests by putting off structural reforms. In this sense, the successive prime ministers have been made their scapegoats.

To many people, deregulation and administrative and fiscal reforms will put an end to the age in which they have been able to enjoy their vested interests for years. Put another way, structural reforms will force every member of the nation's mainstream to meet the challenges arising from a new era of great competition by renewing their ways of thinking and improving their abilities.

Undoubtedly, members of the bureaucratic, business and other establishments recognize the need to promote reforms. After long enjoying their vested interests, however, they want to put off carrying out reforms in a manner that would adversely affect their own circumstances. Instead of grappling with reforms, they insist that their prime minister is to blame for the lack of progress in reforming their country. Consequently, they delude themselves into believing that they are keeping up with the changing times by taking it for granted that one political leader after another has had to be replaced as prime minister over the past decade.

The fact is that this country's premiership has been assumed by politicians at extraordinarily brief and irregular intervals, while bureaucrats, as well as executives at major corporations and government-affiliated organizations, have done little to change their conventional systems for routine personnel changes. It is even more disturbing to see that just about every member of the establishment has learned to regard personal attacks on the prime minister as acceptable, perhaps in an attempt to conceal their own efforts to protect their interests even at the expense of necessary reforms.

Third, it is tempting to raise the question of what would happen to a political leader who earnestly sought to promote deregulation and administrative and fiscal reforms. Such a prime minister would be considered the ultimate threat to the iron triangle of vested interests created by bureaucrats, large corporations and government-affiliated institutions.

Naturally, that prime minister would lose popularity among the power elite. In that event, the prime minister would have to spend a great deal of time intensely fighting members of the establishment who do not share the goal of reforming the nation. This would eventually isolate the prime minister from voters. Former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto is probably an excellent example in this regard. Before stepping down in disgrace, Hashimoto sought to carry out thorough administrative and fiscal reforms. The Japanese public refused to allow him to demonstrate his leadership at a time when they should have done so in the struggle for structural reforms.

Last but not least, let me cite another factor contributing to shortened political life expectancy in this nation--a factor that somewhat differs, in essence, from the reasons mentioned above. It is worth thinking about what kind of life is available to prime ministers and presidents elsewhere in the world after leaving office. It is possible for foreign prime ministers and presidents to become advisers to major corporations and think tanks if they quit politics. They may also be able to enjoy honorable positions gained through their ties with economic circles and other sectors of society.

In Japan, however, most such positions have been taken up by retired bureaucrats. The political community is the only place for a retired prime minister to stay, by remaining a Diet member. Given this, a former prime minister will seek to continue exercising political influence behind the scenes.

This explains why retired Japanese prime ministers have often worked to exercise power in the selection of their successors and in running the administrations led by new prime ministers. Let me say--on a somewhat Machiavellian note--that the more prime ministers a kingmaker produces, the greater power he will exercise.

That is to say, the kingmaker can benefit himself by producing many prime ministers. In addition, allowing one prime minister to remain in office for too long will undermine the interests of the kingmaker. Doing so would encourage the prime minister to become arrogant and eventually grow into a political leader whom kingmaker cannot control.

Not surprisingly, a former prime minister who feels shortchanged after having served in his position for a brief period desperately seeks to exercise influence behind the scenes. This only serves to allow his successor to stay in power for a short period in what amounts to a vicious circle.

Meanwhile, a former prime minister who cannot continue to exercise that kind of power chooses to form a new political party or group. This could shake the foundation of long-established political parties and encourage politicians to create a number of small parties, a development that could continue as an endless game.

Having said all this, I still refuse to say that no solution to the problem can be found. For example, I suggest that a woman be named prime minister. Japanese women may well be given credit for modesty arising from their centuries-old exclusion from the mainstream of society and the consequent absence of vested interests for them to protect. I am certain that no Japanese woman will shy away from carrying out reforms even if she has only a short stay in power, or feel bitter about her short-lived leadership.

(Inoguchi is a professor of political science at Sophia University.)